Burns’ diagnosis: “we have a short-term problem in the form of Russia; but a bigger long-term problem in the form of China.”
Note to readers: this is a bit of a long post, since it is essentially two in one. The first part explores some of the aggressive moves Washington is making against China in Argentina, which appear to have finally triggered a response from Beijing. The costs could be huge for Argentina’s already buckling economy, unless the US is willing to take up the slack (unlikely). The second part concerns the insensitive timing of CIA William Burns’ visit to Buenos Aires last week. But when, pray tell, was the CIA ever known for its sensitivity?
Last Wednesday (March 20), the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William Burns, did something rather extraordinary. He landed in Buenos Aires for an unannounced visit to the Casa Rosada where he met with the Milei government’s Chief of Staff, Nicolás Posse, the Minister of Security, Patricia Bullrich, and the head of the Federal Intelligence Agency (AFI), Silvestre Sívori. It is the second time Burns has met with Posse since Milei came to office, the first being in January when the Argentine politician visited Washington.
This visit by Burns was yet another reminder of just how important Argentina is becoming to US strategic interests in South America, and came on the heels of a visit just weeks earlier by US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken. Then, in two weeks time, the Commander of US Southern Command Laura Richardson will be paying a call. According to the journalist Raúl Kollmann, no other Argentine government has received the dubious honour of an in-person visit from the CIA director (translation my own):
A former head of the then State Intelligence Secretariat, or SIDE (Argentina’s apex intelligence agency), during a Peronist government traveled to the United States to visit one of his children. Beforehand, the CIA’s station chief in Buenos Aires had suggested he take advantage of the trip in order to meet with the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. But in Washington they virtually slammed the door in his face.
“The Director only meets with the agencies with which we can carry out joint operations,” they explained to him. Other heads of the SIDE have fared a little better since: the CIA Director would stop by to say hello, but never for a meeting…
It has been said that the previous head of the CIA, Leon Pannetta, also once visited Argentina, but those who were at the SIDE at the time deny this. No one remembers a similar official visit by a head of North American intelligence — even less so to the Casa Rosada and for a meeting with the Chief of Staff, Nicolás Posse, as well as his counterpart at the AFI, Silvestre Sivori. There was even talk that Burns would meet with Milei, but it did not happen.
Appointed by President Joe Biden in 2021, Burns is a career diplomat who has served every Democratic and Republican president since Ronald Reagan and who, according to the New York Times, has “amassed influence beyond most if not all previous C.I.A. directors.” I would aver that he still has a ways to go before matching the power or influence of Allen Dulles, the agency’s longest serving director who was finally put out to graze in 1961 by John F Kennedy following the CIA’s bungled Bay of Pigs operation.
Although no official agenda was announced for the visit, Burns and his entourage probably discussed many of the same issues already addressed by the front-line US officials who have passed through Buenos Aires since Milei came to office in December. Those issues include bilateral intelligence cooperation; the growing threat posed by terrorist groups, mainly Hizbollah, and “narco-terrorist” groups in Latin America; US interest in Argentina’s strategic resources, including its vast deposits of lithium; and China’s growing economic power and influence in Latin America, which the US government is determined to counter.
It is the last issue that will have topped the agenda, says Kollmann:
Burns’ diagnosis: “we have a short-term problem in the form of Russia; but a bigger long-term problem in the form of China.” He came to speak about China in Argentina and his perspective is that, right now, “joint operations can be carried out.”
It is not hard to see why: no other government in Latin America is tying its mast quite so tightly to Washington’s as Milei’s. Even Ecuador’s Noboa government, which is firmly in the US orbit and has agreed to allow US military presence off its coastline and on its soil, just concluded negotiations for a trade agreement with China. By contrast, Milei has flung insults at Beijing and his government has even flirted with Taiwanese officials.
Reducing and Supplanting Chinese Influence
The US’ main goal in Argentina is to reduce, and wherever possible supplant, Chinese influence in the country, says Kollman. This includes as preferential buyer of Argentinean lithium; as provider of military fighter jets — Argentina was considering purchasing Chinese-Pakistan made JF-17s but will now be buying 24 second-hand F-16s in questionable condition from the Danish air force — and, rather bizarrely, as the new manager of Argentina’s most important waterway, the Paraná river.
As recently reported here, the Milei government has granted authorisation to the US Army Corps of Engineers to operate along the Argentine stretch of the Paraná river, the longest navigable waterway in South America — something Washington has been actively seeking for years. The military engineers will apparently conduct “maintenance duties” along the Paraná-Paraguay river waterway, including dredging the waters — a job that was formerly the responsibilityy of the Belgian company Jan de Nul until its contract ran out last year.
Along the Paraná’s waters pass not only commodities from the agro-export sectors of Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and Brazil but also strategic minerals such as lithium and vast quantities of illicit substances, including cocaine, bound for Europe and Africa. Argentina’s opposition parties are incensed, accusing the government of bypassing Congress and selling out Argentina’s sovereignty.
China, like the US, has major interests in the waterway. As the Argentine journalist Sebastián Cazón notes in an article for Página 12, the main corporate competitors for the route are North American big food behemoths like ADM, Bunge, Cargill and Dreyfus and the Chinese commodities giant COFCO. Chinese companies control two of the major ports along the river, Lima in Buenos Aires and Timbúes in Sante Fe province. Also, a Chinese company, Shanghai Dredging Company, part of the CCCC conglomerate, had expressed an interest in managing the waterway.
China Strikes Back
The US government is also pressuring the Milei government to abandon major infrastructure and scientific projects undertaken by Chinese companies, many of them part of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. They include the construction of two astronomical observatories, in Cuyo and Neuquén, in conjunction with Argentina’s National Commission for Space Activities, which the US claims could be used for military as well as civilian purposes. What the US government often forgets to mention is that it and NATO are also building an observatory in Nequén, Patagonia, just miles down the road from the proposed site for China’s.
Chinese companies were also helping to build Argentina’s fourth nuclear power plant, in Atucha, on the banks of the Paraná river. The project had reached a fairly stage of development but was frozen last year by the Alberto Fernández government as a result of US pressure, particularly during Argentina’s negotiations with the IMF. Now, it is as good as dead and buried.
The same goes for the Néstor Kirchner-Jorge Cepernic hydroelectric plant river that was being built by a Chinese-led consortium. The project, involving the construction of two dams on the Santa Cruz river, represents the largest bilateral infrastructure project ever attempted between the two countries. The plant was meant to provide for the daily electricity consumption of 1.5 million Argentine households and cut almost $1.1 billion off Argentina’s oil and gas import expenses each year. It should have been completed four years ago, but construction was stalled by the Macri government and then dogged by geological issues. Now, it has been frozen again, and the Chinese appear to have run out of patience…
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Nick Corbishley 